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Abstract
This study investigates the factors that were important in the failure of banks 
in 1997-2006. The study uses cross-section time series data from 81 banks and 
employs limited dependent variable models. The major objectives are to examine 
the determinants of bank failures by explaining the contribution of both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic factors in the Turkish banking system and to 
estimate the likelihood of banking failure.
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1. Introduction
During the recent decades of trade and financial liberalization, the 
frequency of financial sector crises has risen both in developed and 
emerging market economies (Brown and Dinc, 2005). In Latin America, 
severe banking crises occurred in Chile and Colombia during the 1980s and 
in Mexico and Venezuela during the first half of the 1990s. The Turkish 
cases in 2000 and 2001 represent the most recent crises in an emerging 
market economy. The banking system problems that have occurred in Japan 
during the mid-1990s, in the UK in the early 1990s, in the US during the 
mid-1980s and early 1990s, and in the Nordic countries during the early 
1990s have widely discussed in empirical literature.
The IMF (1998) report identifies several general categories of 
problems, which are frequently associated with financial crises (both
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banking and currency crises): unsustainable macroeconomic policies, 
weaknesses in financial structure, global financial conditions, exchange rate 
misalignments, and political instability. Moreover, Ozkan-Gunay and Tektas 
(2006) pointed out that poor banking practices, capital inadequacy, poor 
credit evaluation process, lack of revenue diversification, connected lending, 
maturity and currency mismatches, rapid increase in non-performing loans 
are the main causes of severe banking crises (Ozkan-Gunay and Tektas, 
2006). Furthermore, for political reasons, preemptive actions regarding large 
bank failures are not taken by the governments at the periods just preceding 
the elections. This can be considered as one of the major reasons for severe 
banking crises, at least for emerging market economies (Brown and Dinc, 
2005).
Both multinomial logit model and traditional binary model are applied 
to selected eigenvectors and variables based on principal component 
analysis in order to predict the probability of bank failures and determine the 
factors that affect bank failures. This study also analyzes econometrically 
the bank-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank failures. In this 
study, the primary objective is to distinguish the state of problematic banks 
as failure and mergers/acquisition, using a multinomial logit model. Since a 
multinomial model discriminates between two failure outcomes and uses 
more information (i.e., failed banks versus mergers/acquisition), it is likely 
to be a better predictor of bank failures (Matthews and Whitfield, 2006). The 
other objectives are to examine the determinants of banking failures, to 
estimate the likelihood of banking failure, to analyze the contribution of 
microeconomic and macroeconomic factors in banking system problems in 
Turkey, and to identify leading indicators of banking failures in Turkey. 
This study is organized as follows: the next section provides a review of 
literature. Section 3 presents background of financial crisis in Turkey. 
Section 4 describes the data set used in the analysis and gives the results of 
principal component analysis and the descriptive statistics. Section 5 
illustrates the estimation technique, the results of the estimated model and 
prediction. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
The empirical literature on the determinants of bank failures and 
banking crises1 is large. Mainly, the empirical literature can be divided into
1 It is useful to distinguish between bank failures and banking crises. Banks, like other firms, are 
likely to encounter financial difficulties when the difference between the value of their assets 
and the value of their liabilities is negative (i.e. technical insolvency) (Demirguc-Kunt, 1989). 
A problem at a bank may be associated with the failure of other banks, if each bank is 
simultaneously affected by the same shock. This would suggest that banking system problems 
are more likely if the banks have similar fundamental characteristics. The banking crises in the 
Nordic countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden) during the early 1990s are an example of this 
(Bell and Pain, 2000).
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three different approaches: microeconomic, macroeconomic, and mixed 
approaches. Microeconomic studies on bank failures are mainly based on the 
bank specific variables used in CAMEL rating categories2, which are taken 
from the banks’ financial statements. These studies use cross-section, micro­
level data of specific countries’ or regions’ data. On the other hand, in the 
macroeconomic approach, the role of macroeconomic conditions on banking 
crises such as interest rates, inflation rates, Central Bank foreign exchange 
reserves, credit expansion, etc., as well as the role of institutional variables 
such as central bank independence, explicit deposit insurance, financial 
liberalization proxies etc., are examined (Gonzales-Hermosillo, 1999). 
These studies use cross-country and time-series macroeconomic data. 
Moreover, the mixed approach uses both bank-specific and macroeconomic 
variables.
Thomson (1991) estimated the logit model by using only financial 
statements of U.S. banks operating from 1982 to 1989 to predict the 
probability of bank failures. Thomson (1991) used CAMEL-motivated 
proxy variables to determine bank condition such as book equity capital, the 
loans to assets ratio, overhead to total assets ratio, deposits per branch, and 
size in terms of assets. Similarly, Logan (2001) also used a logit model to 
examine the balance sheet characteristics of small and medium-sized UK 
banks and identified leading indicators of bank failures over the period of 
1989 and 1991. Logan (2001) found that the most important indicators in 
determining future failure were high dependence on net interest income, low 
profitability, low loan growth, and low short-term assets relative to 
liabilities.
Another thread of literature on banking crises used cross-country time- 
series macroeconomic data. In explaining cross-country comparisons in 
banking crises, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) and Hardy and 
Pazarbasioglu (1998) tried to utilize only macroeconomic variables to 
monitor banking sector fragility in a large sample of countries. Demirguc- 
Kunt and Detragiache (1999) emphasized that low GDP growth rate, high 
real interest rate, high inflation, high M2 to Central Bank foreign exchange 
reserves ratio, and high growth of real private credit significantly increase 
the likelihood of systemic problems. Along with an unstable macroeconomic 
environment, institutional characteristics had a role in systemic problems. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) also constructed a rating system for 
bank fragility using estimated crisis probabilities from a logit model. A 
similar study from Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998) suggested that systemic
2 CAMEL is a rating system to evaluate the financial conditions of the banks for supervisory 
purposes. It has five categories: capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings 
and profitability, and liquidity. It was developed by US regulators. Variations of this 
framework are widely used by regulatory and supervisory agencies in a number of countries to 
evaluate the state of banks.
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Santor (2003) used a limited dependent variable model to examine 
contagion across banking systems in developed and developing countries 
(over 90 countries during 1975-1998) using only macroeconomic variables. 
Santor (2003) found that the probability of banking crises increases as 
countries have slow economic growth, high inflation, and high real interest 
rates. Besides, information contagion plays a significant role in predicting 
future banking crises. Hutchison and McDill (1999) also used a multivariate 
probit model to examine banking distress for a large sample of developed 
and developing countries (65 countries) in 1975-1997. Accordingly, they 
found a statistically significant association between the variables such as 
GDP growth rate, asset prices, and institutional factors such as Central Bank 
independence, explicit deposit insurance, financial liberalization, and the 
probability of banking sector distress in the sample countries and in Japan.
Gonzales-Hermosillo, et al. (1997) and Gonzales-Hermosillo (1999) 
used both bank-specific and macroeconomic variables to determine bank 
fragility and the factors of bank failures for Mexico, Columbia, and the US 
banking systems. Gonzales-Hermosillo (1999) found that the banking 
distress index tended to overstate the number of occurrences of banking 
problems. The results of this study showed that capital equity to total assets 
ratio and non-performing to total assets ratio, which was the proxy of 
fragility, were the main indicators of banking problems. The availability of 
quarterly data3 in this study also improved the performance of the use of the 
limited dependent regression model so that it could give the possibility to 
monitor the evolution of the failure probability and to take preventive action 
before the failure (Gaytan and Johnson, 2002).
Bernhardsen (2001) has followed Gonzales-Hermosillo (1999) to 
predict the likelihood of bank failures and used a random-effects probit 
model to predict bankruptcies in Norway. Furthermore, Sales (2005) and 
Gonzales-Hermosillo et al. (1997) provide a financial fragility index for 
each bank, based on the probability of failure of banks. This index suggested 
that both Mexican and Brazilian banking systems showed signs of fragility 
before the crises.
While choosing either the microeconomic or the macroeconomic 
approach, a critical issue is to define bank failure and insolvency. Insolvency 
exists when the market value of the bank or the market value of the capital 
of the bank or institution turns out to be negative. Nevertheless, failure can 
be seen as the legal recognition of a bank’s preexisting economic
problems were related to a fall in real GDP growth, fluctuations in inflation,
credit expansion, increase in real interest rates, decline in real exchange
rates, and adverse trade shock.
3 In banking crises studies, annual data was used commonly due to unavailability of quarterly or 
monthly data for less developed countries. Naturally, the performance of the model of the early 
warning of financial problems that uses annual data may be poor.
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insolvency. As a matter of fact, it is a choice that supervisory or regulatory 
institution may put into operation or not (Demirguc-Kunt, 1989). As 
assessing the definition of bank failures, de jure failure takes place as 
economic insolvency is judged officially and the bank is closed or 
involuntarily merged out of existence, whereas de facto failure occurs when 
any regulatory authority cancels the bank’s license (Demirguc-Kunt, 1989). 
As a result, the bank regulatory authority can be considered as the only 
determinant of both types of failure.
3. An overview of the Twin Financial Crisis in Turkey in 
2000-2001
After financial liberalization4, Turkey experienced three serious crises 
in April 1994, November 2000, and February 2001. The Turkish financial 
system suffered accordingly. Alper and Onis (2002) stated that 
macroeconomic imbalances, high and rising fiscal deficits, high inflation 
and real interest rates, the distortions created by state owned banks, full 
deposit insurance scheme, connected lending, high exposure concentrations, 
large foreign exchange positions, and weakness of regulation and 
supervision in the banking system are the major reasons of emerging market 
financial crises, especially in Turkey (Alper and Onis, 2002).
During the 1990s, the Turkish economy experienced high political 
instability. There were three elections and eleven governments. Brown and 
Dinc (2005) write that politicians had a motivation to take the costly action 
of postponement of severe regulatory intervention in bank failures until after 
the elections. This is because of the fact that failures of large banks may 
have an adverse effect on the economy at least in the short run (Rogoff and 
Sibert, 1988). Takeovers or closing of failing banks naturally necessitates 
large funds by taxpayers. Politicians will always choose not to handle such 
issues before the elections (Brown and Dinc, 2005). In the 1990s, the 
political instability in Turkey delayed the regulations in the banking sector 
as theory suggested.
Along with such political economy concerns regarding bank failures, 
there were high chronic inflation and high public sector borrowing because 
of the expansionary fiscal policies after the 1980s and loose monetary 
policies in the early 1990s. Furthermore, private commercial banks invested 
in government securities that issued short-term debt at high interest rates, by
4 The Turkish banking sector has developed considerably in the liberalization era of the 1980s. 
Introducing uniform accounting principles, allowing to borrow directly from abroad by 
syndicated loans, establishing an interbank money market (Istanbul Stock Exchange and 
Capital Markets Board), starting T-bills and government bonds auctions and also technological 
and human resources improvements in the sector has helped the growth of the banking sector in 
Turkey (Ozkan-Gunay and Tektas, 2006).
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opening longer-term foreign exchange (FX) positions. After the 1994 crisis5, 
in Turkish banking system, there were three main problems related to the 
above distorted incentives: opening foreign exchange positions, a large 
number of weak banks providing connected lending, and banking 
supervision by the Treasury which had borrowing needs from banks 
(Rijckeghem and Ucer, 2005).
In December 1999, Turkey adopted an IMF stabilization program, 
which sought to ensure debt sustainability, to reduce chronic and high 
inflation with the use of foreign exchange as a nominal anchor, fiscal 
adjustment, and several structural measures. The 1999 IMF program also 
aimed to reform the banking sector by forming independent supervision and 
to rehabilitate state banks and improve the performance of the banking 
sector (Alper and Onis, 2002). Thus, the new banking law was enacted in 
the year of 1999, establishing the independent Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA)6 compatible with the regulation and 
supervision standards of the Basel committee, removing the distortions 
created by the state owned banks, setting the appropriate prudential 
requirements in line with international standards, and encouraging mergers 
of the banks to eliminate the weaknesses of the system.
However, the design of the 1999 IMF program did not provide 
measures on foreign exchange risks and liquidity risks in the banking sector. 
Although there was legislation about restrictions on open foreign exchange 
positions, widening open foreign exchange positions was ignored in order to 
meet large public sector borrowing requirements (Rijckeghem and Ucer, 
2005). Despite liquidity risks, there were excessive restrictions on the 
Central Bank’s ability to be the Lender of the Last Resort in the design of 
the program, since the IMF program eliminated the Central Bank’s facility 
of implementing implicit insurance mechanism against systemic risks 
involving interbank deposits by specifying a ceiling on its Net Domestic 
Assets as a performance criteria (Alper and Onis, 2002). Furthermore, the 
number of weak banks in the banking sector was underestimated, though 
five private banks were taken under the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund at 
the beginning of the IMF program (Ertugrul and Selcuk, 2001). The last 
issue is that the short-term borrowing and lending operations of state banks 
related to the so-called ‘mission’ losses were also neglected in the design of 
the IMF program, creating vulnerability to the shocks in the banking system.
5 At the beginning of 1994, the Central Bank increased the interest rates and the Turkish lira was 
devalued by 60%. The overnight interest rates peaked to 1000%, resulting in panic in the 
financial system (Ozkan-Gunay and Tektas, 2006). With liquidity problems of the banks in 
conjunction with the depositor runs in the spring of 1994, the currency crisis resulted in the 
withdrawal of permission for carrying out banking operations of three medium-sized banks. In 
April 1994, the stabilization, structural adjustment policies, and full coverage of insurance 
scheme for bank deposits were introduced (Ertugrul and Selcuk, 2001).
6 BRSA was in full operation by September 2000.
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Along with these effects, in February 2001, the currency peg had to be 
abandoned and replaced by free-floating regime. Therefore, the Turkish 
economy and its banking system were hit hard by the crises of 2000 and 
2001. The size of the banking system in terms of assets contracted by 17% 
of GDP and 35% of banks were eliminated from the system. The resulting 
output loss of the twin crises was substantial and the economy contracted by 
over 9% in 2001, which was the nation's most severe recession since 1945 
(Alper and Onis, 2002).
To recapitulate, the following factors led the Turkish financial system 
to experience a crisis in November 2000: First, there were the problematic 
issues in sustaining capital inflows. Second, despite the existence of an 
exchange rate risk and the financial need of the Treasury, there was not 
sufficient support by the IMF. Third, as a result of widening open foreign 
exchange positions, large amounts of duty losses of state banks, connected 
lending of weak banks under the full deposit insurance scheme, weak 
implementation of supervision by the Treasury due to conflicts of interest, a 
large number of weak banks, and unfavorable external conditions, the 
banking system was highly fragile.
The crises of November 2000 and February 2001 stemmed primarily 
from the fragility o f the banking sector. The Turkish experience shows that 
both public and private banks contributed significantly to the outbreak of the 
economic crises. In retrospect, it can be expressed that private commercial 
banks played an instrumental role in November 2000, while public banks 
emerged as the central actors in the context of the subsequent crisis of 
February 2001 (Alper and Onis, 2002). As discussed throughout this section, 
all distorted incentives in the Turkish banking sector such as opening foreign 
exchange positions, liquidity problems, poor asset quality, and capital 
inadequacy due to the weakness of regulation and supervision in the banking 
system is analyzed in conjunction with the empirical specification in the 
next section.
In the empirical part of the paper, high levels of liquidity, asset quality, 
and good management of banks are found to be the major determinants of 
bank survival, as expected. Furthermore, as a supervisory tool, the estimated 
degree of fragility of individual banks and the overall banking system may 
serve as a leading indicator of coming difficulties. These findings may help 
institutions like the Banks Association of Turkey and the Banking 
Supervision and Regulation Agency to devise or fine-tune their procedures 
in detecting banking sector fragilities. The main drivers of the failures in 
Turkey, which are discussed in this paper, are analyzed econometrically. For 
this, discrete choice models, a duration model, and a dynamic panel data 
model are used.
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4. Data
The quarterly data for bank-specific variables are drawn from the 
balance sheet and income statements, which are used to compute financial 
ratios for 36 failed banks, of which 8 are mergers and acquisitions, and 457 
non-failed banks. These financial statements are collected from the quarterly 
reports of The Banks Association of Turkey8 over the period of December 
1997- June 20069. Moreover, the quarterly macroeconomic data are obtained 
from IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS10) for the same period.
Microeconomic variables are mainly based on CAMEL rating 
categories (capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings 
and profitability and liquidity), which are taken from the banks’ financial 
statements. Besides, by using macroeconomic variables, the role of 
macroeconomic conditions on banking crises such as interest rates, inflation 
rates, Central Bank foreign exchange reserves and credit expansion etc,, are 
examined (Gonzales-Hermosillo, 1999). Both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic variables that appear in previous studies, with few 
exceptions, have been identified as good indicators of failures.
4.1. Principal component analysis
Principal component analysis is a multivariate statistical technique. 
Principal components are linear combinations of the variables that explain 
variance-covariance properties of the variables. Direct uses of principal 
component analysis are the identification of groups of inter-related 
variables, the reduction of number of variables, and a method of 
transformation of data (Anderson, 2003). Principal component analysis is a 
technique of categorizing patterns in data and expressing the data in such a 
way to highlight their similarities and differences. The main advantage of 
principal component analysis is to compress the data by reducing the 
dimension without loss of information (Anderson, 2003).
From the point of view of statistical theory, Anderson (2003) argued 
that the set of principal components yields a convenient set of coordinates, 
and the accompanying variances of the components characterize their 
statistical properties. In statistical practice, the method of principal
7 The total number of banks in the banking system (except participation banks) is 46, excluding 
the Birleşik Fon Bankası which is in the group of banks in the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 
as of June 2006. Moreover, 89.34% of paid-in capital of Türk Dış Ticaret Bankası A.Ş. was 
transferred to Fortis Bank in July 2005. However, Fortis Bank was not included in the sample 
due to its lack of data.
8 http://www.tbb.org.tr/net/donemsel/default.aspx?dil=EN
9 In this period, there is a difference between the date of the last financial statements issued and
the date of failure for some of the failed banks. Therefore, in the estimation process, the date of 
the last financial statements is taken as the date of failure, as in Molina (2002).
10 http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/ifsbrowser.aspx?branch=ROOT
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components is used to find linear combinations with large variance 
(Anderson, 2003). Therefore, principal component analysis yields 
orthogonal explanatory variables and eigenvectors, and removes collinearity 
in the estimation.
The motivation in using principal component analysis is to identify 
highly correlated variables. This is done so that later econometric analysis 
will suffer less in accuracy and reliability. It is more likely to have highly 
correlated subsets of variables when there are a large number of variables in 
the database, as is the case here. The objective of principal component 
analysis is to reduce the dimensionality (number of variables) of the dataset 
but retain most of the original variability in the data (Anderson, 2003). The 
first principal component accounts for as much of the variability in the data 
as possible, and each succeeding component accounts for as much of the 
remaining variability as possible.
Both microeconomic variables and macroeconomic variables are 
separately subjected to principal component analysis. As the first step, the 
factors whose eigenvalues are greater than one should be retained for both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic variables separately. The first principal 
component is the eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue. If  the 
eigenvalues are small, the loss of information will be less. Next,, the first p 
eigenvectors having eigenvalues greater than one are classified based on 
CAMEL categories and macroeconomic conditions. Principal component 
analysis is utilized to classify eigenvectors and to determine proxy variables 
and corresponding eigenvectors for each CAMEL category from the pool of 
independent variables, which summarizes the financial information of the 
banks and macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, the Bartlett's test for 
sphericity for the presence of correlation and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy are used before the principal 
component analysis, Both the Bartlett test of sphericity and the KMO 
confirm that the principal component analysis is appropriate11.
Table 4.1 presents the eigenvalues of factors for both microeconomic 
and macroeconomic variables. Based on the results of the principal 
component analysis, the first eight eigenvectors whose eigenvalues are 
greater than one for microeconomic variables and the first three eigenvectors 
whose eigenvalues are greater than one for macroeconomic variables are 
chosen.
11 The Bartlett test of sphericity for microeconomic and macroeconomic variables equal 31101.5 
and 20101.4 (p=0.00), respectively, so the model is statistically significant. Furthermore, the 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy for microeconomic and macroeconomic variables are 
equal to 0.65 and 0.75, respectively, and they are above the accepted level of 0.50 for both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic variables.
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T a b le  4.1
Eigenvalues o f Factors for M icroeconomic and Macroeconomic
Variables




1 3.81 0.20 0.20
2 2.75 0.14 0.35
3 2.07 0.11 0.45
4 1.81 0.10 0.55
5 1.69 0.09 0.64
6 1.51 0.08 0.72
7 1.02 0.05 0.77
8 1.00 0.05 0.82
1 4.98 0.50 0.50
2 2.54 0.25 0.75
3 1.04 0.10 0.86
The first eight eigenvectors for microeconomic variables explain 82 
percent of total variance and the first three eigenvectors for macroeconomic 
variables explain 86 percent of total variance (see Table 4.1). Tables A.1 and 
A.2 in the Appendix section present the variables that have the highest factor 
scores related to these eigenvectors. The classifications of eigenvectors are 
based on these scores. However, there are very close scores in a single 
eigenvector. Principal component analysis is again applied to those variables 
that have close eigenvalues to determine the selected variables in such a 
situation.
Based on the classification of eigenvectors, the first eigenvector is 
named as the size category for share in sector in terms of assets.12 The 
classifications of the other seven eigenvectors are named as earning category 
for the ratio of income before tax to total assets, liquidity category for the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets13, asset quality category for the ratio of 
permanent assets to total assets14, earnings category for the ratio of net
12 The share in sector in terms of loans has a greater factor score than that of the share in sector in 
terms of assets. In the second application of the principal component analysis with four 
variables—share in sector in terms of loans, assets, deposits and logarithmic value of assets— 
the share in sector in terms of assets has the greatest score with 0.53.
13 Although the ratio of total loans to total assets has the greatest score in the first step, in the 
second application of the principal component analysis with four variables—the ratio of loans 
to assets, the ratio of liquid assets to assets, the ratio of FX liquid assets to FX liabilities, the 
ratio of total deposits to number of branchesshare in the sector in terms of assets has the 
greatest score with 0.61.
14 In the second application of the principal component analysis with four variables—the ratio of 
permanent assets to total assets, the ratio of FX deposits to number of branches, the ratio of
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income to shareholder equity, management category for the ratio of total 
deposits to number of branches15, liquidity category for the ratio of foreign 
exchange liquid assets to foreign exchange liabilities, and asset quality 
category for the ratio of total loans to net working capital, respectively.
The variables and eigenvectors selection procedure based on principal 
component analysis is also applied to ten macroeconomic variables in table 
A.2 in the Appendix section, covering the macroeconomic conditions of the 
country. Among the macroeconomic variables, the first three eigenvectors 
can be named as credit channel category for credit growth16, real costs 
category for real interest rate variable, and real effect category for GDP 
growth.
4.2. Descriptive Statistics
The selection of the explanatory eigenvectors depends on both bank- 
specific and macroeconomic variables to predict bank failures that have 
been mentioned in the previous section. As a preliminary check, a test of 
mean differences is done as in Hutchison and McDill (1999). This can 
describe different movements in microeconomic variables for the 
failed/merged banks and non-failed banks separately. For failed/merged 
banks, one quarter before the failure was excluded from the data in order to 
assess the pattern of explanatory variables for failed banks before the crisis. 
Therefore, this test reports differences between the failed/merged banks and 
the non-failed banks during non-failure periods.
The mean differences of the microeconomic eigenvalues and variables 
for both non-failed and failed banks are given in table 4.2. In the first and 
second column, the mean values for both failed and non-failed banks are 
shown17 and the last column illustrates the p-value of mean difference tests18. 
According to the mean difference test, all variables are found significantly 
higher in non-failed banks than in failed banks. If  mean values for non-failed 
banks are higher (lower) than that of failed banks then the sign of estimated 
coefficients can be expected to be negative (positive) in line with t-test 
results.
total deposits to number of branches, and the ratio of permanent assets to liquid assets—the 
ratio of permanent assets to total assets has the greatest score with 0.66.
15 In the second application of the principal component analysis with three variables—the ratio of 
total deposits to number of branches, the ratio of permanent assets to liquid assets and the ratio 
of FX deposits to number of branches—the ratio of total deposits to number of branches has the 
greatest score with 0.69.
16 In the second application of the principal component analysis with four variables—credit 
growth, the ratio of credit to private sector to GDP, the ratio of domestic credit to GDP and 
inflation rate—credit growth has the greatest score with 0.51.
17 The standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
18 The two-sample t-test is used to determine if the two population means are equal.
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T a b le  4 .2
M ean Difference Test19 for Selected Eigenvectors and Variables










Share in Sector (T. Assets) 1.93 (3.68) 0.88 (1.14) 0.00
Size Category 0.10 (2.11) -0.28 (1.40) 0.00
Income Before Tax/T. Assets 3.43 (8.88) -0.03 (25.54) 0.00
Earnings Category 0.13 (1.33) -0.37 (2.29) 0.00
Liquid Assets/T. Assets 44.53 (23.12) 45.81 (22.98) 0.27
Liquidity Category -0.01 (1.47) 0.00 (1.34) 0.97
Permanent Assets/T. Assets 12.88 (12.75) 15.04 (14.48) 0.86
Asset Quality Category 0.14 (1.20) -0.38 (1.64) 0.00
Net Income/S. Equity 0.10 (1.00) 0.06 (2.77) 0.05
Earnings Category 0.05 (0.74) -0.14 (2.19) 0.00
T. Deposits/No. of Branches 16.14 (35.87) 18.37 (31.44) 0.20
Management Category -0.02 (1.08) 0.07 (1.56) 0.14
FX Liquid Assets/FX 47.80 (54.76) 36.65 (24.86) 0.00
Liquidity Category 0.01 (0.91) -0.01 (1.23) 0.03
T. Loans/Net Working Capital -0.07 (2.22) 0.01 (0.30) 0.38
Asset Quality Category -0.01 (1.16) 0.01 (0.22) 0.69
The share in sector in terms of total assets, the size of banks in terms 
of assets can be negatively related to the likelihood of failure since relatively 
large banks may diversify risks subject to small banks. Besides “too large to 
fail” policies can help decrease the failure probability for relatively large 
banks (Gonzales-Hermosillo et al., 1997). The ratio of foreign exchange 
liquid assets to foreign exchange liabilities reflects the liquidity structure 
and foreign exchange exposure risk. Again, the ratio is expected to be 
negatively related to the probability of bank failure. The expected signs of 
these selected eigenvectors and related variables based on t-tests are 
consistent with the theoretical view.
From the income-expenditure side of the banks, the ratio of total 
deposits to the number of branches can be assessed in terms of efficiency. It 
is assumed that managerial ability can be measured to the extent that it can 
be a sign of explicit managerial decisions. Within the same context, the ratio 
of income before tax to total assets and the ratio of net income to 
shareholders’ equity reflect the earnings condition of the banks.
As expected, the earnings and management quality proxy variables are 
negatively related to the probability o f bank failure. However, the sign o f the 
earnings proxy may be positive since riskier investments are more profitable
19 Ho: Mean (Exp. var. for failed banks) -  Mean (Exp. var. for non-failed banks) = 0
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depending on the condition of the banks. Furthermore, the ratio of total 
loans to net working capital and the ratio of permanent assets to total assets 
can be assessed in the asset quality category. Banks that failed during the 
sample period had a higher ratio of total loans to net working capital and 
ratio of permanent assets to total assets. The interpretation of this is 
straightforward: A high level of the ratio of total loans to net working capital 
indicates a high level of credit risk of the banks.
Based on the t-test results, except for the eigenvectors related to the 
liquidity category, management category, and asset quality category, the 
eigenvectors related to other CAMEL categories including size category are 
significant at the one percent significance level. Similarly, except for the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets, the ratio of permanent assets to total 
assets, the ratio of total deposits to number of branches and the ratio of total 
loans to net working capital, other variables are again significant at the one 
percent significance level, based on mean difference test results. Therefore, 
the mean values of selected explanatory variables and eigenvectors for non­
failed banks are different from those for failed banks. This provides 
preliminary evidence that motivates further analysis.
We have thus prepared a set of eigenvectors and variables based in 
principal component analysis that will be utilized in the empirical 
specification; the discrete choice model. Multinomial and binary logit 
models are used by comparing the predictive accuracy o f the models in 
order to capture the different outcomes of failure with the same selected 
eigenvectors and related variables, separately.
5. Discrete choice model
Both a multinomial logit model and a traditional binary model are 
applied to the selected eigenvectors based on principal component analysis 
in order to predict the probability of bank failures and determine the factors 
of bank failures. The traditional logit model for panel data is used to explain 
the probability o f bank failure. In each quarter, the bank is either 
experiencing a failure or not. Accordingly, the dependent variable is a binary 
outcome taking the values of 0 when the bank fails or 1 when it survives. 
Let i = 1, 2,.., 81 denote the banks and t = 1, 2 , . . 3 5  denote the quarters for 
the ith bank. The conventional function, which indicates the cumulative 
standard logistic probability distribution function, is described as follows:
Prob (Failureit = 1) = exp (XitP) / (1+ Xitp ) (5.1)
Equation (5.1) is estimated using maximum likelihood procedure. Moreover, 
the probability o f bank failures that will occur at a particular time in a 
particular bank is hypothesized to be a function of a vector of n explanatory 
variables Xit and P is a vector of n unknown coefficients20 (Greene, 1997).
20 See Greene (1997) for a full exposition of the derivations.
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A multinomial logit model, which is used to differentiate between 
bank failures, mergers/acquisitions, and non-failed outcomes, is estimated 
by maximum likelihood. Again, let i = 1, 2,.., 81 denote the banks and t = 1, 
2 ,..., 35 denote the quarters for the ith bank. The conventional function is 
described as follows:
2
Prob (Yit = j) = exp ( X ^ )  / (^  XkPk) for j=  0,1 or 2 (5.2)
k=0
where Yit is a random variable indicating the state of the banks in each 
quarter. This can take a value of j = 0, 1 or 2, which represents non-failed, 
failure, and mergers/acquisition, respectively. The vector Xit represents a set 
of exogenous variables and P represents regression parameters to be 
estimated. The estimated equations above provide a set of probabilities for 
the j + 1 choices for an individual with characteristics Xit (Greene, 1997). 
Equation (5.2) is estimated again using the maximum likelihood procedure. 
Moreover, the multinomial logit model assumes independence of odd ratios 
of different alternatives; therefore, the model requires that the assumption of 
‘independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)’ be satisfied (Greene 1997). In 
order to validate this assumption, the Hausman specification test as well as 
the Small-Hsiao IIA test is presented in table A.3 in the Appendix section.
5.1. Estimation results
This section presents both multinomial logit models, which jointly 
determine failure, merger/acquisition, and non-failure, and standard binary 
logit models, in which merger/acquisition and failure outcomes are pooled. 
Tables 5.1-5.4 illustrate the specifications for the binary and multinomial 
logit models. The first three columns for each model illustrate the estimated 
coefficients, the relevant statistics of significance (z) and the p-value, 
respectively. The first model specification includes only bank-specific 
eigenvectors and variables and the second one combines both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic eigenvectors and variables for both 
models.
The results21 of the binary model in table 5.1 show that all bank- 
specific eigenvectors, except for the size category, liquidity categories, and 
one of the asset quality categories, are significant at the one percent 
significance level. Moreover, for the joint-significance of variables, the 
Wald and LR22 tests are applied and in both model specifications, the null 
hypothesis of zero coefficients of explanatory variables is rejected at the one 
percent significance level (see table 5.1).
21 These results based on panel data in which the observations responding from the failure quarter 
onwards are excluded for both models.
22 LR test statistics is equal to the difference between log likelihood values of the model in the first 
iteration and the last iteration, which is multiplied by minus 2 (Gonzales-Hermosillo, 1999).
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T a b le  5.1
Estimation Results o f Binary Logit Model for Selected Eigenvectors23
Variables / Models Model 1 Model 2
Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z
Microeconomic Variables
Size Category -0.24 -0.89 0.38 -0.13 -0.72 0.47
Earnings Category -0.80 -4.64 0.00 -0.49 -4.93 0.00
Liquidity Category -0.37 -1.44 0.15 -0.15 -0.97 0.33
Asset Quality Category -0.51 -2.87 0.00 -0.47 -3.73 0.00
Earnings Category -0.40 -2.48 0.01 -0.28 -2.43 0.02
Management Category 0.37 2.00 0.05 0.16 1.26 0.21
Liquidity Category 0.32 1.11 0.27 0.25 0.94 0.35
Asset Quality Category 0.02 0.04 0.97 0.03 0.10 0.92
Intercept Dummy 2.09 2.26 0.02 2.26 3.54 0.00
Constant -6.94 -5.70 0.00 -6.13 -12.1 0.00
Macroeconomic Variables
Credit Channel - - - 0.41 2.68 0.01
Real Cost - - - 0.27 2.44 0.02
Real Effect - - - -0.05 -0.27 0.79
Model Fit
AIC 234.50 217.90
Pseudo R2 0.233 0.247
Diagnostic Test of Validity of Regressors
LR 100.38 136.95
Wald 31.91 72.34
Table 5.2 reports that all selected bank-specific variables except for 
the share in sector in terms of assets, the ratio of liquid asset to asset, the 
ratio of net income to equity, deposits per branch, and the ratio of loans to 
net working capital are significant at the one percent significance level. 
These results are consistent with the results of the binary logit model with 
selected eigenvectors. Moreover, for joint-significance of variables, the 
Wald and LR24 tests are applied and in both model specifications, and the 
null hypothesis of zero coefficients of explanatory variables is rejected at 
one percent significance level (see tables 5.1 and 5.2).
23 The eigenvector selection procedure based on principal component analysis is explained in 
detail in section 4.1.
24 LR test statistics is equal to the difference between log likelihood values of the model in the first 
iteration and the last iteration, which is multiplied by minus 2 (Gonzales-Hermosillo, 1999).
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Tables 5.1 and 5.2 also show the overall model selection criteria with 
Akaike’s information criteria (AIC)25 and Pseudo R226. According to both 
criteria, the estimates in the full model specification, which use both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic variables, provide higher Pseudo R2 
and lower AIC values than that of the former one, which uses only 
microeconomic variables.
T a b le  5 .2
Estimation Results o f Binary Logit Model for Selected Variables27
Variables / Models Model 1 Model 2
Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z
Microeconomic Variables
Share in Sector (T. Assets) -0.21 -1.16 0.25 -0.13 -0.99 0.32
Income Before Tax/T. Assets -0.05 -5.52 0.00 -0.05 -6.07 0.00
Liquid Assets/T. Assets 0.01 0.62 0.53 0.01 1.25 0.21
Permanent Assets/T. Assets 0.03 2.42 0.02 0.01 1.19 0.24
Net Income/S. Equity 0.05 0.68 0.50 0.02 0.28 0.78
T. Deposits/No. of Branches 0.00 0.03 0.98 0.00 0.64 0.52
FX Liquid Assets/FX Liabilities -0.04 -2.86 0.00 -0.03 -3.05 0.00
T. Loans/Net Working Capital 0.07 0.23 0.82 0.05 0.18 0.85
Intercept Dummy 1.97 2.48 0.01 3.58 4.14 0.00
Constant -5.36 -5.87 0.00 -3.93 -5.68 0.00
Macroeconomic Variables
Credit Growth - - - -0.04 -2.75 0.01
Real Interest Rate - - - 0.02 2.52 0.01
GDP Growth - - - -0.06 -2.03 0.04
Model Fit
AIC 248.29 222.34
Pseudo R2 0.215 0.254
Diagnostic Test of Validity of Regressors
LR 96.07 116.03
Wald 43.49 76.72
25 AIC can be used for the model having different number of variables. It can be defined as the sum of 
log likelihood value and the number of explanatory variables, which is multiplied by minus 2.
26 Pseudo R2 can be used for comparing the fit of different models for the same dependent variable. It is 
equal to one minus the ratio of the log likelihood value of the model in the first iteration to the log 
likelihood value in the last iteration (Gonzales-Hermosillo, 1999).
27 The variable selection procedure based on principal component analysis is explained in detail in 
section 4.1.
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For the second quarter of 2001, a crisis dummy variable28 is included 
in both model specifications for each model and it is found positive and 
statistically significant. From tables 5.1 and 5.2, the full specification of the 
models, earning categories and asset quality category are found negative and 
statistically significant, as expected (see table 5.1). This means that the said 
categories are negatively related to bank failures. As in the estimation with 
variables, the ratio of income before tax to total assets and the ratio of 
foreign exchange liquid assets to foreign exchange liabilities are negative, as 
expected. They have a negative effect on the probability of failure (see table 
5.2). The results of the two different estimations have consistency in terms 
of significance of the independent variables.
From the macroeconomic perspective, in most studies, there is 
evidence that if there is a credit expansion in the economy, banking sector 
problems can be expected (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). In this 
study, credit growth is likely to be positively associated with the likelihood 
of failure. Lower GDP growth rate or adverse developments in the real side 
of the economy can be a main source of banking sector problems 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). The real interest rate is likely to be 
related to the proxy of macroeconomic mismanagement, which adversely 
affects the economy and the banking system through various channels. 
Therefore, the sign of the estimated coefficient of real interest rate turns out 
to be positive. In this study, except for the credit growth variable, other 
macroeconomic variables have the expected signs. Only the eigenvector 
related to macroeconomic real effect is statistically insignificant. There is no 
additional proper information on banking failure in the estimation with 
eigenvectors. This is because of the fact that ingredients of the said 
eigenvector have the composition of the other variables (see Section 4).
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 report the results of the re-estimation of two 
specifications of both selected eigenvectors and variables using a 
multinomial logit model. Again, all banks and all periods are included in the 
pooled sample. The coefficients that affect the probability of 
merger/acquisition positively also affect the probability of failure positively 
and vice versa. The coefficients differ largely across the probabilities of 
merger/acquisition and failure in both specifications of the multinomial logit 
model. However, the estimated coefficients in both binary and multinomial 
logit models are close to each other for the failed banks. Moreover, the 
dummy variable is found statistically insignificant which is different from 
that of binary logit model. There is no effect of financial crisis on the 
probability of merger/acquisition.
28 The effect of the crisis that occurred in February 2001 can be seen from the financial reports of the 
banks, which were published in the second quarter of 2001. Therefore, a dummy variable is included 
to both model specifications per model. It takes the value 1 from 2001.q2 to 2006.q2 but 0 elsewhere.
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In table 5.4, the sign o f the coefficient on the variable "net income / 
shareholders’ equity" is positive. This may be unexpected. However, the 
sign of the earnings proxy is not clear “a priori”. Although profitability can 
signal a well-functioning bank, excessively risky projects can be very 
profitable for a while before the failure. In this study, the profitability proxy 
variable has a positive impact on hazard rate. In other words, the 
profitability o f the banks has a negative impact on the survival of the banks.
It is also tested that whether the binary models are valid restrictions of 
the multinomial models. Table 5.2 reports the likelihood based on Pseudo R2 
statistics and a statistical test that discriminates formally between the binary 
and multinomial specifications. With regard to the former one, the estimates 
in the multinomial logit model provide higher pseudo R2 values than the 
binary model in each specification.
Furthermore, table A.3 in the Appendix section indicates that both 
model specifications with selected eigenvectors and variables confirm the 
validity o f the IIA assumption based on both Hausman and Small-Hsiao 
specification tests. Moreover, in Wald tests for combining outcomes, the 
null hypothesis—namely, that the categories can be collapsed—is strongly 
rejected for both specifications in the multinomial logit model29.
5.3. Prediction
Thomson (1991) pointed out that the discrete choice models order a 
bank as failed if the predicted value of the dependent variable exceeds an 
exogenously set cut-off probability. The cut-off probability is typically set at 
0.5. However, as unsatisfactory results are obtained using a cut-off 
probability of 0.5, it is suggested that the cut-off probabilities should be 
corrected by using the mean of predicted values of the dependent variable. 
In addition, if  a type I error30 is regarded to be more costly than a type II 
error, a lower value for the cut-off probability can be adjusted (Thomson, 
1991).
In examining both the binary and the multinomial logit models from 
tables A.4-A.7 in the Appendix section, the prediction results for the cut-off
29 For the first model specification with selected eigenvectors, which uses only microeconomic 
variables, test statistics for all categories of failed-merger/acquisition, failed-non-failed, and 
merger/acquisition-non-failed are 46.97 (sign level 0.00), 40.60 (sign level 0.00), and 69.08 
(sign level 0.00) with 9 degrees of freedom, respectively. For the full specification with 
selected eigenvectors, test statistics are 38.70 (sign level 0.00), 57.18 (sign level 0.00), and 
64.94 (sign level 0.00) with 12 degrees of freedom, respectively. For the first specification with 
selected variables, test statistics are 69.83 (sign level 0.00), 48.03 (sign level 0.00), and 66.19 
(sign level 0.00) with 9 degrees of freedom, respectively. Lastly, for the full specification with 
selected variables, test statistics are 47.72 (sign level 0.00), 63.56 (sign level 0.00), and 75.66 
(sign level 0.00) with 12 degrees of freedom, respectively.
30 Type I error occurs when a failed bank is incorrectly classified as a non-failed bank and type II 
error occurs when a non-failed bank is incorrectly classified as a failed bank (Thomson, 1991).
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probability o f 0.5 are not satisfactory. Accordingly, only 9 banks for the 
binary logit model estimated with both selected eigenvectors and related 
variables out of all failed banks are correctly classified as failed banks in any 
quarters of the sample period. Moreover, only 7 and 9 banks for the 
multinomial logit model estimated with both selected eigenvectors and 
related variables out of all failed banks are correctly classified as failed 
banks in any quarters of the sample period, respectively. Based on the mean 
predicted values, the predictive accuracy jumped from 20% to 75% in the 
category of predicted as a failure in the quarter of failure in both the binary 
and the multinomial logit model estimated with both selected eigenvectors 
and related variables. Further, for the other categories, the results are more 
satisfactory than that of former one (see tables A.4-A.7 in the Appendix 
section).
In the last column of tables A.4-A.7, the third alternative of cut-off 
probability is given. It reports that the calculated percentage of predictive 
accuracy is based on different cut-off probabilities for each quarter; that is, 
they vary with the mean of the predicted values of the dependent variable 
quarter by quarter. In the binary models, with different cut-off probabilities, 
the overall prediction varies between 89% and 45% for estimated with 
eigenvectors, and 92% and 34% for estimated with variables, respectively. 
In the multinomial models, giving almost the same result, the overall 
prediction varies between 89% and 44% for estimated with eigenvectors, 
and 94% and 33% for estimated with variables, respectively. Naturally, 
models with higher cut-off probabilities present more accurate results in 
non-failed observations correctly classified than in failed observations 
correctly classified. This adjustment provides the minimization of failure 
costs.
Detailed prediction results of failed banks for both models that are 
given in tables 5.5 and 5.6 are constructed based on different cut-off 
probabilities for each quarter. Binary logit models correctly classify 88% of 
all the failures in any quarter for estimated with eigenvectors and 92% of all 
the failures in any quarter for estimated with variables; in the quarter of 
failure, 83% of the failures for estimated with eigenvectors and 78% of the 
failures for estimated with variables and at least four quarters before the 
failure 89% of the failures for estimated with eigenvectors and variables.
Moreover, the multinomial logit model gives almost the same results 
with the binary logit model. Accordingly, in tables 5.7 and 5.8, it correctly 
classifies 89% of the failed banks as a failure in any quarter for estimated with 
eigenvectors and 94% of all the failures in any quarter for estimated with 
variables. The rates in the quarter of failure are 81% of the failures for 
estimated with eigenvectors and 79% of the failures for estimated with 
variables. The rates in the category of at least four quarters before the failure 
are 89% of the cases for estimated with eigenvectors and 92% of the cases for
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T a b le  5 .5
Prediction Results for Binary Logit Model for Selected Eigenvectors
Failed Banks
Atlas Yatırım Bankası A.Ş.
Bank Ekspres A.Ş.
Bank Kapital Türk A.Ş. 
Bayındırbank A.Ş.
Birleşik Türk Körfez Bankası A.Ş. 
Ak Uluslararası Bankası A.Ş. 
Credit Lyonnais Turkey 











Milli Aydın Bankası T.A.Ş. 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.
Okan Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 
Osmanlı Bankası A.Ş.
Pamukbank T.A.Ş.
Park Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 
Rabobank Nederland 
Sınai Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 
Sitebank A.Ş.
Sümerbank A.Ş.
Tekfen Yat. ve Fin. Bankası A.Ş. 
Toprakbank A.Ş.
Türk Dış Ticaret Bankası 
Türkiye Emlak Bankası A.Ş.
TTB Yaşarbank A.Ş.
Türkiye İmar Bankası T.A.Ş. 
Ulusal Bank T.A.Ş.
Yurt Ticaret ve Kredi Bankası 
Number of incorrectly classified 
Percentage of incorrectly classified
Not Predicted as a Predicted as a
Predicted Failure in the Failure 4
as a Quarter of Quarters







































METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 117
T a b le  5 .6
Prediction Results for Binary Logit Model for Selected Variables
Failed Banks
Atlas Yatırım Bankası A.Ş.
Bank Ekspres A.Ş.
Bank Kapital Türk A.Ş. 
Bayındırbank A.Ş.
Birleşik Türk Körfez Bankası A.Ş. 
Ak Uluslararası Bankası A.Ş. 
Credit Lyonnais Turkey 











Milli Aydın Bankası T.A.Ş. 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.
Okan Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 
Osmanlı Bankası A.Ş.
Pamukbank T.A.Ş.
Park Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 
Rabobank Nederland 
Sınai Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 
Sitebank A.Ş.
Sümerbank A.Ş.
Tekfen Yat. ve Fin. Bankası A.Ş. 
Toprakbank A.Ş.
Türk Dış Ticaret Bankası 
Türkiye Emlak Bankası A.Ş.
TTB Yaşarbank A.Ş.
Türkiye İmar Bankası T.A.Ş. 
Ulusal Bank T.A.Ş.
Yurt Ticaret ve Kredi Bankası 
Number of incorrectly classified 
Percentage of incorrectly classified
Not Predicted as a Predicted as a
Predicted Failure in the Failure 4
as a Quarter of Quarters
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Table 5.7







Predicted as a 
Failure in the 
Quarter of the 
Failure




Atlas Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. NO YES YES
Bank Ekspres A.Ş. NO YES YES
Bank Kapital Türk A.Ş. NO YES YES
Bayındırbank A.Ş. NO YES YES
Birleşik Türk Körfez Bankası A.Ş. NO NO YES
Ak Uluslararası Bankası A.Ş. NO NO YES
Credit Lyonnais Turkey NO YES YES
Credit Suisse First Boston NO NO YES
Demirbank T.A.Ş. YES NO NO
EGS Bankası A.Ş. NO YES YES
Egebank A.Ş. NO YES YES
Eskişehir Bankası T.A.Ş. NO YES YES
Etibank A.Ş. NO YES YES
Fiba Bank A.Ş. NO YES YES
iktisat Bankası T.A.Ş. NO YES YES
ING Bank N.V. YES NO NO
Interbank NO YES YES
Kentbank A.Ş. NO YES YES
Milli Aydın Bankası T.A.Ş. NO YES YES
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. YES NO NO
Okan Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. NO YES YES
Osmanlı Bankası A.Ş. YES NO NO
Pamukbank T.A.Ş. NO YES YES
Park Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. NO YES YES
Rabobank Nederland NO YES YES
Sınai Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. NO YES YES
Sitebank A.Ş. NO YES YES
Sümerbank A.Ş. NO YES YES
Tekfen Yat. ve Fin. Bankası A.Ş. NO YES YES
Toprakbank A.Ş. NO YES YES
Türk Dış Ticaret Bankası NO YES YES
Türkiye Emlak Bankası A.Ş. NO YES YES
TTB Yaşarbank A.Ş. NO YES YES
Türkiye im ar Bankası T.A.Ş. NO YES YES
Ulusal Bank T.A.Ş. NO YES YES
Yurt Ticaret ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş. NO YES YES
Number of incorrectly classified 4 7 4
Percentage of incorrectly classified 11.11 19.44 11.11
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T a b le  5 .8
Prediction Results for Multinomial Logit Model for Selected Variables
Failed Banks
Atlas Yatırım Bankası A.Ş.
Bank Ekspres A.Ş.
Bank Kapital Türk A.Ş. 
Bayındırbank A.Ş.
Birleşik Türk Körfez Bankası A.Ş. 
Ak Uluslararası Bankası A.Ş. 
Credit Lyonnais Turkey 











Milli Aydın Bankası T.A.Ş. 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.
Okan Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 
Osmanlı Bankası A.Ş.
Pamukbank T.A.Ş.
Park Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 
Rabobank Nederland 
Sınai Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 
Sitebank A.Ş.
Sümerbank A.Ş.
Tekfen Yat. ve Fin. Bankası A.Ş. 
Toprakbank A.Ş.
Türk Dış Ticaret Bankası 
Türkiye Emlak Bankası A.Ş.
TTB Yaşarbank A.Ş.
Türkiye İmar Bankası T.A.Ş. 
Ulusal Bank T.A.Ş.
Yurt Ticaret ve Kredi Bankası 
A m b e r  of incorrectly classified 
Percentage of incorrectly classified
Not Predicted as a Predicted as a
Predicted Failure in the Failure 4
as a Quarter of Quarters
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estimated with variables. These results suggest that the elements that 
contribute to banking failure may be in place for four quarters or more 
before the failure. According to both models, banks in difficulties one year 
before the failure should have failed; however, political reasons or the 
weakness in regulation and supervision can delay the failure process.
6. Conclusion
This study attempted to estimate the probability of individual bank 
failures, which is a function of both bank-specific and macroeconomic 
eigenvectors and corresponding variables. We estimated both binary and 
multinomial models. Banks with a strong liquidity state in terms of foreign 
exchange, higher earnings, and asset quality have a role to decrease the 
likelihood of banking failures.
From the macroeconomic perspective, higher credit growth and real 
interest rates are associated with a higher probability of banking failures. 
The results are consistent with the findings of Wheelock and Wilson (2000), 
Logan (2001), and Molina (2002) in samples of US, UK, and Venezuelan 
banks, respectively. The significance of macroeconomic variables is also 
consistent with the studies of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and 
Hutchison and McDill (1999).
However, the aim of this study is not to construct a manual for bank 
failures for supervisory institutions. The findings can be interpreted as the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants of the failure probabilities 
of the Turkish banking system with different models. According to 
prediction results, the multinomial logit model with estimated variables 
gives slightly more accurate results than that of the other three 
specifications.
The findings in this study may help decision makers in supervisory 
institutions in terms of the determinants of bank failures in the Turkish 
banking system. Moreover, it can provide a motivation for developing a 
duration model for the determination and prediction of timing of failures 
since the discrete choice models do not use information concerning how 
long banks survive.
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7. Appendix
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T a b le  A .2
The Scores o f the First Three Factors with M acroeconomic Variables
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
GDP Growth -0.228 -0.248 0.603
Depreciation 0.233 0.364 0.349
Real Interest Rate -0.062 0.556 0.362
M2/CB Foreign Reserves -0.243 0.373 -0.473
Credit Growth 0.399 0.105 -0.268
Credit to Private Sector/GDP -0.398 0.027 0.041
Domestic Credit/GDP -0.419 0.035 -0.044
Bank Liquid Assets/Bank Reserves 0.257 -0.407 0.176
Interbank Interest Rate 0.306 0.405 0.212
Inflation 0.423 -0.124 -0.087
T a b le  A .3
Tests o f the Independent Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) Assumption31
Models Model 1 Model 2





Tests of IIA 
assumption
omitted 1 x2(10) = 0.023 
(1.000)
omitted 2 x2 (10) = 0.002 
(1.000)
omitted 1 x2 (10) = 15.120 
(0.128)
omitted 2 x2 (10) = 13.185 
(0.213)
omitted 1 x2 (13) 
(1.000)
omitted 2 x2 (13) 
(1.000)
omitted 1 x2 (13) 
(0.293)






Tests of IIA for the Model with Selected Variables
Hausman Tests omitted 1 x2 (10) = 0.001 omitted 1 x2 (13) = 0.001
of IIA (1.000) (1.000)
assumption omitted 2 x2 (10) = 0.003 
(1.000)
omitted 2 x2 (13) 
(1.000)
= 0.003
Small-Hsiao omitted 1 x2 (10) = 17.269 omitted 1 x2 (13) 21.620
Tests of IIA (0.069) (0.062)
assumption omitted 2 x2 (10) = 8.947 
(0.537)
omitted 2 x2 (13) 
(0.720)
= 9.684
31 In the table, the dummy variable d represents the state of the banks (takes on values of 0, 1, or 
2); non-failed, failed and mergers/acquisitions banks, respectively.
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Table A.4







Predicted as a failure (in any quarter) 
correctly
25.00 86.11 88.89
Predicted as a failure in the quarter of 
failure correctly
25.00 69.44 83.33
The percentage of non-failed observations 
that are correctly classified
100.00 85.87 68.12
The percentage of failed observations that 
are correctly classified (included all quarters 
before the failure)
2.03 16.21 44.57
T a b le  A .5






Predicted as a failure (in any quarter) 
correctly
22.22 97.22 91.67
Predicted as a failure in the quarter of failure 
correctly
19.44 75.00 77.78
The percentage of non-failed observations that 
are correctly classified
100.00 83.23 70.36
The percentage of failed observations that are 
correctly classified (included all quarters 
before the failure)
1.66 20.44 34.44
32 The cut-off probability in the second column is the mean of predictive values, 0.017, and in the 
third column it is the mean of predicted values of dependent variable quarter by quarter.
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Table A.6








Predicted as a failure (in any quarter) correctly 25.00 86.11 88.89
Predicted as a failure in the quarter of failure 
correctly
25.00 69.44 80.56
The percentage of non-failed observations that 
are correctly classified
100.00 88.05 66.73
The percentage of failed observations that are 
correctly classified (included all quarters 
before the failure)
2.03 15.84 44.20
T a b le  A .7







Predicted as a failure (in any quarter) 
correctly
27.78 97.22 94.44
Predicted as a failure in the quarter of failure 
correctly
25.00 69.44 77.78
The percentage of non-failed observations 
that are correctly classified
100.00 87.06 70.23
The percentage of failed observations that are 
correctly classified (included all quarters 
before the failure)
2.03 19.15 32.97
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Özet
Türkiye'de banka batışlarının kesikli seçim modelleri ile kestirimi
Bu çalışma, 1997-2006 yılları arasında Türkiye’de banka batışlarına ilişkin etmenleri 
incelemektedir. Çalışma, 81 bankanın akış kesiti zaman serisi verlerini kullanarak limitli bağımlı 
değişken modeli ile incelemektedir. Bu çalışmada amaç banka batışlarını belirleyen etmenlerden 
mikroekonomik ve makroekonomik değişkenlerin katkılarını açıklamak ve banka batış olasılıklarını 
tahmin etmektir.
Anahtar kelimeler: Banka batışları, Kesikli seçim modeli, Türkiye.
JEL kodları: G21, E44, E47.
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T a b le  5 .3
Estimation Results o f Multinomial Logit Model for Selected Eigenvectors3
1 (Failed) 2 (Merger/Acquisition) 1 (Failed) 2 (Merger/Acquisition)v ariabies / Muueis
Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z
Microeconomic Variables
Size Category -0.05 -0.40 0.69 -0.07 -0.18 0.86 -0.08 -0.56 0.58 -0.13 -0.32 0.75
Earnings Category -0.64 -5.22 0.00 -0.46 -3.84 0.00 -0.54 -3.73 0.00 -0.30 -2.38 0.02
Liquidity Category -0.05 -0.29 0.78 -0.34 -1.21 0.23 -0.09 -0.50 0.61 -0.32 -1.16 0.25
Asset Quality Category -0.35 -2.70 0.01 -0.22 -1.59 0.11 -0.43 -3.02 0.00 -0.33 -2.36 0.02
Earnings Category -0.23 -2.59 0.01 -0.06 -0.42 0.67 -0.25 -2.87 0.00 -0.08 -0.56 0.58
Management Category 0.01 0.08 0.94 0.63 2.76 0.01 -0.05 -0.27 0.79 0.53 2.49 0.01
Liquidity Category 0.47 3.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.95 0.35 2.12 0.03 -0.06 -0.35 0.72
Asset Quality Category 0.03 0.80 0.42 0.28 1.95 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.98 0.30 1.79 0.07
Intercept Dummy 0.68 1.48 0.14 1.77 1.65 0.10 2.26 2.41 0.02 3.08 1.49 0.14
Constant -5.42 -13.48 0.00 -7.61 -7.47 0.00 -6.37 -9.01 0.00 -8.86 -5.52 0.00
Macroeconomic Variables
Credit Channel - - - - - - 0.47 2.23 0.03 0.19 0.52 0.60
Real Cost - - - - - - 0.22 2.03 0.04 0.61 1.97 0.05








Diagnostic Test of Validity of Regressors
33 Eigenvectors (also used in binary models) selection procedure based on principal component analysis is explained in detail in section 4.1.
386 Özlem ÖZDEMİR -  Levent BORAN
LR 110.06 126.33
Wald 106.29 121.52
T a b le  5 .4
Estimation Results o f Multinomial Logit Model for Selected Variables34
Variables / Models
1 (Failed) 2 (Merger/Acquisition) 1 (Failed) 2 (Merger/Acquisition)
Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z
Microeconomic Variables
Share in Sector (T. Assets) -0.13 -1.24 0.22 -0.04 -0.37 0.71 -0.16 -1.45 0.15 -0.05 -0.36 0.72
Income Before Tax/T. Assets -0.06 -4.99 0.00 0.03 2.66 0.01 -0.06 -4.61 0.00 0.02 2.08 0.04
Liquid Assets/T. Assets 0.01 0.88 0.38 0.02 0.63 0.53 0.01 1.04 0.30 0.01 0.51 0.61
Permanent Assets/T. Assets 0.02 1.81 0.07 0.04 3.36 0.00 0.01 0.78 0.43 0.03 2.08 0.04
Net Income/S. Equity 0.07 2.96 0.00 -0.16 -2.62 0.01 0.05 2.08 0.04 -0.11 -1.55 0.12
T. Deposits/No. of Branches 0.00 0.62 0.54 0.00 0.34 0.73 0.00 0.22 0.83 0.01 1.20 0.23
FX Liquid Assets/FX Liabilities -0.03 -2.28 0.02 -0.03 -1.40 0.16 -0.03 -2.46 0.01 -0.03 -1.64 0.10
T. Loans/Net Working Capital 0.00 0.20 0.84 0.17 2.38 0.02 -0.01 -0.24 0.81 0.19 2.26 0.02
Intercept Dummy 0.78 1.71 0.09 2.07 1.87 0.06 3.91 3.01 0.00 3.64 1.27 0.21
Constant -4.79 -7.19 0.00 -7.74 -4.41 0.00 -3.90 -5.98 0.00 -7.19 -4.25 0.00
Macroeconomic Variables
Credit Growth - - - - - -  -0.06 -2.17 0.03
34 Variables (also used in binary models) selection procedure based on principal component analysis is explained in detail in section 4.1.
-0.02 -0.51 0.61
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Real Interest Rate - - - - - - 0.03 2.31 0.02 0.02 1.46 0.15
GDP Growth - - - - - - -0.03 -0.83 0.40 -0.11 -1.67 0.10
Model Fit
AIC 268.18 238.60
Pseudo R2 0.285 0.344
Diagnostic Test of Validity of Regressors
LR 114.18 137.76
Wald 120.66 134.66
T a b le  A .1
The Scores o f the First Eight Factors with M icroeconomic Variables
Variable+ Classification Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8
Net Working Capital/ T. Assets 































T. Loans/T. Assets Asset Quality 0.203 0.084 -0.514 -0.136 -0.219 0.020 0.042 0.017
T. Loans/S. Equity Asset Quality 0.110 0.008 -0.245 -0.277 0.583 0.063 0.010 -0.008
T. Loans/Net Working Capital Asset Quality -0.020 0.000 0.008 -0.021 0.002 0.006 -0.119 0.992
Permanent Assets/Liquid Assets Asset Quality -0.073 -0.336 0.160 0.348 0.156 0.365 -0.055 -0.007
Net Income/No. of Branches Management -0.047 0.274 -0.185 0.007 -0.121 0.244 -0.175 -0.039
FX Deposits/No. of Branches Management -0.036 0.201 0.231 -0.362 -0.113 0.502 -0.002 -0.009
T. Deposits/No. of Branches Management -0.009 0.173 0.344 -0.416 -0.080 0.349 -0.011 -0.006
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Income Before Tax/T. Assets Earnings -0.130
Net Income/T. Assets Earnings -0.088
Net Income/S. Equity Earnings -0.032
Liquid Assets/T. Assets Liquidity -0.256
FX Liquid Assets/FX Liabilities Liquidity 0.015
Share in Sector in terms of T. Assets Size 0.453
Share in Sector in terms of T. Loans Size 0.455
Share in Sector in terms of T. Deposits Size 0.443
Log (T. Assets) Size 0.430
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0.455
0.439
0.057
0.129
-0.033
0.116
0.126
0.100
0.102
-0.077
-0.107
0.161
0.422
0.058
0.196
0.096
0.217
0.038
0.282
0.284
0.232
-0.091
-0.025
0.165
0.131
0.158
-0.077
0.107
0.104
- 0.651
0.153
0.021
0.076
0.034
0.083
-0.047
0.208
0.161
-0.083
-0.244
0.013
0.005
0.025
-0.007
-0.074
0.094
0.114
0.043
-0.058
0.958
-0.028
-0.035
-0.019
-0.013
0.009
0.013
0.006
-0.027
0.112
0.004
0.011
0.003
0.011
